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Abstract 
Juxtaposing the private papers of Louis Mountbatten and Claude Auchinleck, this article seeks to 
illuminate the crux at the centre of the reconstitution of the British Indian army into Indian and 
Pakistani armies, namely, their worsening relationship between April and November 1947, in 
view of what they saw as each other’s partisan position and its consequences, the closure of 
Auchinleck’s office and his departure from India. In doing so in considerable detail, it brings to 
fore yet another aspect of that fraught period of transition at the end of which the British Indian 
Empire was transformed into the dominions of India and Pakistan and showcases the peculiar 
predilections in which the British found themselves during the process of transfer of power. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Army may be split into two parts’ – proclaimed the Daily Telegraph in London on 4 June 
1947, a day after the announcement of the plan that partitioned the British empire in India.0F1 
This division or ‘reconstitution’, as it was softly termed, of the British Indian Army turned 
out to be one of the most contested aspects of the ‘breaking up’ of India.1F2 It was a matter of 
the highest sensitivity for the two emerging dominions, beset by mistrust between their 
political leaderships. It acquired a still more special significance in the wake of worsening 
                                                          
1 Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven, 2007), p. 96.  
2 See Anwesha Sengupta, ‘Breaking Up: Dividing Assets between India and Pakistan in times of Partition’, The 
Indian Economic & Social History Review, 51: 4 (2014), pp. 529-548. 
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inter-communal relations in the subcontinent in August-September, followed by the 
possibilities of outright inter-dominion conflict in the princely states of Junagadh and Jammu 
and Kashmir over September-October.2F 3 Among the key personalities on whose personal 
equations and political positions hinged this ‘reconstitution’ were Lord Louis Mountbatten, 
the last Viceroy of British India and first Governor-General of independent India and Field 
Marshal Claude Auchinleck, the last Commander-in-Chief of British Indian Army and first 
Supreme Commander of Armed Forces in India and Pakistan. They, as Thomas Elmhirst, first 
Air Chief Marshal of independent India, wrote, did not ‘ever [see] quite eye to eye’.3F4  
 
In the accumulated literature on partition and its many aspects, not nearly enough has been 
written on the process of partition, that is, the division of assets of British India between its 
succeeding dominions.4F5 Within this process, the individual imprimatur of Mountbatten and 
Auchinleck, with their worsening mutual relations, had implications, which have gone lightly 
remarked. The first British literary wave on partition comprised essentially participatory 
                                                          
3 On the former see Vazira Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia (New York, 
2007); for the latter, see Rakesh Ankit, ‘The accession of Junagadh, 1947-48: Colonial Sovereignty, State 
Violence and post-Independence India’, The Indian Economic & Social History Review, 53: 3 (2016), pp. 371-
404 and The Kashmir Conflict: From Empire to the Cold War, 1945-66 (London, 2016). 
4 Thomas Elmhirst, Recollections; privately published by RT Roger Elmhirst (1991), Churchill Archives Centre, 
Churchill College, Cambridge, p. 110. 
5 For exceptions see Ranbir Samaddar, The Marginal Nation (Delhi, 1999), Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh 
Kudaisya, eds., Partition and Post-colonial South Asia (London, 2007), Joya Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition: 
Bengal and  India, 1947–67 (Cambridge, 2007), Duncan McLeod, India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals or 
Enemies (Aldershot, 2008) and Pallavi Raghavan, ‘The Finality of Partition: Bilateral Relations between India 
and Pakistan, 1947–57’, PhD Dissertation, (University of Cambridge, 2012).  
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account(s) especially focussed around Mountbatten and his great ‘mission’.5F6 Then, there were 
the reminiscences of Indian and Pakistani politicals, which were directed more towards each 
other, though in Pakistan there was expressed greater bitterness towards Mountbatten.6F 7 
Professional historians came upon the scene in late-1960s,7F8 and the historical scholarship 
burgeoned in the 1970s and 1980s, following the release of official documents in Britain.8F9 
Located firmly within the discourses of ‘decolonisation and nationalism(s)’, the emerging 
literary corpus focussed on constitutional developments and communal deterioration in India 
and analysed the ‘strategy(s)’ of the British, the Indian National Congress and the All-India 
Muslim League.9F10  
 
With respect to the future of the British Indian Army, the treatment was limited to a largely 
unanimous expression of the rather improbable British desire of a united Indian army in a 
divided India, which was opposed by the League’s insistence that the ‘British Indian army 
should be divided’.10F11 Otherwise, it was feared that Pakistan would ‘collapse like a pack of 
                                                          
6 See, for instance, Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London, 1951), EWR Lumby, The 
Transfer of Power in India, 1945-7 (London, 1954), Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit (Berkeley, 1962) and HV 
Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (London, 1969). 
7 For example, VP Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Bombay, 1957) and Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, The 
Emergence of Pakistan (New York, 1967). 
8 With the publication of CH Phillips and Mary Wainwright, ed., The Partition of India: Policies and 
Perspectives, 1935-1947 (London, 1970). 
9 See the classic trinity by RJ Moore, Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem 
(Oxford, 1983), Making the New Commonwealth (Oxford, 1987) and Endgames of Empire (Oxford, 1988). 
10 For a discussion of the place of partition in South Asian histories see Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya, 
The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia (London, 2000), pp. 9-19. 
11 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India 1936-1947 (Oxford, 1987), p. 227. 
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cards’.11F 12  The narrative was established that this led to the setting up of a Supreme 
Commander’s Headquarters and a Joint Defence Council, which divided the army and from 
which Auchinleck had to step down ‘following Indian complaints that he favoured Pakistani 
interests’.12F13 The consequence was acknowledged that the process of division of equipment 
and stores did not go smoothly, thereby putting Pakistan at a disadvantage. The outbreak of 
hostilities in Kashmir further hindered this division. When the revisionist ‘high politics’ 
literature moved towards a critical interpretation of Mountbatten’s role in 1947, it coalesced 
around three issues: his alleged interference with the judicial independence of the Cyril 
Radcliffe Boundary Commission, his hastening of the date of Partition and concomitant 
failure in provisioning adequate safeguards against communal violence and his subsequent 
Governor-General-ship of India, where his closeness with Jawaharlal Nehru led to his 
partisan attitude on the Kashmir dispute.13F14  
 
Since the late-1980s, studies of 1947 rightly became ‘regional’ and then from 1990s, devoted 
to the tragic ‘human dimension’ of partition, they further moved beyond all-India characters 
and concerns.14F15 In the last decade, the broader, over-arching narrative approach has made a 
return among studies of partition and its long afterlife in South Asia.15F 16  However, 
                                                          
12 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: the Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge, 
1990), p. 38. 
13 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India (Cambridge, 2009), p. 158. 
14 See Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (London, 1994) and Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South 
Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab (Manchester, 2013). 
15 For a discussion of the more recent trends in the evolution of the partition historiography see Talbot and Singh, 
The Partition of India, pp. 8-23. 
16 See, for popular examples, Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of Empire 
(London, 2007) and Nisid Hajari, Midnight Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India’s Partition (New Delhi, 2015). 
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Mountbatten continues to be largely approached along the old axis of boundary award, 
communal violence and princely states, while Auchinleck continues to be noted for his 
‘attachment to the unity of the Indian army’, which, therefore, gave him ‘sleepless nights’ at 
the prospect of its division.16F17 The greater emphasis remains on the significance for India and 
Pakistan, of the fact that ‘national leaders publicly countenanced this [the division of the 
army] only after the decision to partition’, with the consequent ‘sudden, complicated and 
deliberately vague’ untangling.17F18 In the recently emerged literature on the ‘Indian Army and 
the End of the Raj’, the ‘Military and Indian Democracy since Independence’, and, ‘Pakistan 
and its Army’, the interregnum of August-November 1947, when Auchinleck’s tenure at the 
head of the British Indian Army had not ended, Indian dominion and democracy had not 
begun and Pakistan’s army was not stabilised, gets reduced to no more than either an 
epilogue or a prologue.18F19 The global turn in military history-writing around British Indian 
Army’s involvement in the Second World War has even less to remark, naturally, on this 
liminal episode on the break-up of that vaunted military machine,19F20 which also gets over-
                                                          
17 Khan, The Great Partition, p. 97 and Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: the Last Years of the British Empire 
in India (Oxford, 2006), p. 156. 
18 Khan, The Great Partition, p. 96 
19 See Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (Cambridge, 2014), Steven Wilkinson, Army 
and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence (Harvard, 2015) and Shuja Nawaz, 
Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and Wars within (Karachi, 2008). 
20 See, for examples, Srinath Raghavan, India’s War: the Making of Modern South Asia, 1939-45 (New Delhi, 
2016) and Yasmin Khan, The Raj at War: A People’s History of India’s Second World War (London, 2015). 
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shadowed in the histories of nation-states in India and Pakistan since 1947, which begin 
properly from 1950s.20F21    
 
This article seeks to address this gap by focusing on the crux at the centre of the 
‘reconstitution’ of the British Indian Army into Indian and Pakistani armies, namely, the 
deteriorating relationship of Mountbatten and Auchinleck between April and November 1947. 
Mining their private papers, supplementing them with papers of those sympathetic to them, 
like the soldier Hastings Ismay and the diplomat Laurence Grafftey-Smith respectively, and 
drawing upon published memoirs and correspondences, it presents in considerable detail, 
what they saw as each other’s partisan position and probes its major consequence: the 
preponed closure of Auchinleck’s office and his early departure from India. In doing so, it 
throws light on another odd aspect of that fraught period of transition from the British Indian 
Empire to the dominions of India and Pakistan and shows yet more of the peculiar 
predilections in which the withdrawing British got embroiled.  
 
Between 14 August and 30 November 1947, the situation in the divided subcontinent 
deteriorated dramatically. Violence raged across North India especially in and around the 
national capital region of New Delhi.21F 22  It was accompanied with a stupendous-scale 
migration of people; rendering imperial subjects overnight into refugees before they could 
                                                          
21 See Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi (London, 2007), Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A New History (London, 
2012), Ted Svensson, Production of Post-colonial India and Pakistan: Meanings of Partition (London, 2013) 
and Gyan Prakash et al, eds., The Postcolonial Moment in South and Southeast Asia (London, 2018). 
22 See Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Partition and Independence in Delhi: 1947-48’, Economic and Political Weekly, 32: 
36 (Sep. 6-12, 1997), pp. 2261-2272.  
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become citizens.22F23 It was joined, in early-September, by the crisis of accession in the princely 
state of Junagadh in western India taking a military turn.23F24 Then, the simmering dispute in the 
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir broke-out into a proper conflict in end-October.24F25 At 
the heart of these events, which eclipsed early India-Pakistan relations, was a breakdown of 
the colonial apparatus, in transition to serve its post-colonial successors. Even as the process 
of partitioning assets and the army was far from complete, a vortex of war-like mobilisation 
had begun in Kashmir, Punjab and Kathiawar. While the nationalists on both sides were 
engaged in the latter, it was men like Mountbatten and Auchinleck, who were presiding over 
the former; a process that was at the heart of the successful, if bloody, end of empire and 
stable, if unequal, emergence of its successor dominions: India inherited ‘14/20 armoured 
regiments, 40/48 artillery regiments, 21/29 infantry regiments, larger part of the air force and 
navy and 137, 000/160, 000 tonnes of ordinance’.25F26  
 
By showing this process through the papers of Mountbatten, Auchinleck and others, this 
article, firstly, seeks to contribute to existing understanding of the origins of the conflictual 
relations between India and Pakistan. More than that, it aims to illuminate the embroiled 
nature of the British withdrawal wherein it was the British personalities at odds with each 
other, who too contributed to make it a partisan process of partition. Finally, it attempts to 
illustrate the uneasy coexistence of certain British officials and Indian politicals especially on 
                                                          
23 See Taylor Sherman, William Gould and Sarah Ansari, eds., From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the 
Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947-1970 (Cambridge, 2014).  
24 See Rakesh Ankit, ‘Junagadh, India and the Logic of Occupation and Appropriation, 1947–49’, Studies in 
History, 34: 2 (2018), pp. 109-140.   
25 See Christopher Snedden, Kashmir: The Untold Story (Delhi, 2013).  
26 Perry Anderson, The Indian Ideology (London, 2013), p. 67. 
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the three-fold question of first nationalisation, then partition and their respective 
psychological impacts on the morale of a colonial army, employment of Indian troops abroad 
for various purposes, and the day-to-day functioning of the Defence Department, about which 
Nehru and his colleagues protested at being kept ‘in the dark’, from even before the transfer 
of power.26F27 Afterwards, as two nations strove to establish their states and armies, Britons 
were either subsumed in one or the other like Mountbatten in India or remained 
‘supranational’ like Auchinleck,27F28 leading to a strained triangular transmission of power.         
 
Prelude 
 
Mountbatten and Auchinleck first came together on the question of British Indian Army long 
before the events of 1947. In January 1944, Auchinleck’s beloved Indian Army was under 
fire from American war correspondents, who were questioning whether Indian troops would 
fight for the British in South-east Asia, especially Burma.28F29 It was slanderous considering the 
stellar record of the British Indian Army right from the days of the First World War. To 
counter this mischievous propaganda, Auchinleck requested Mountbatten to send some of the 
senior US officers under his South East Asia Command to visit Indian units and see them at 
work.29F 30  Auchinleck cautioned Mountbatten’s headquarters that the politically motivated 
American correspondents were not as friendly towards the British, given the anti-colonial 
                                                          
27 National Archives of India (NAI). Cabinet Secretariat. File No. 114/CF/46, 18 September 1946. 
28 John Connell, Auchinleck (London, 1959), p. 913. 
29 Hartley Library (HL), University of Southampton. MB1/C136 (Folder 1), Mountbatten Papers. No. 1, Halifax 
(Washington) to War Department (New Delhi), 3 January 1944. 
30 HL. MB1/C136 (Folder 1). Mountbatten Papers. DO No. 80/M-3/23, Auchinleck to Mountbatten, 5 January 
1944. 
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movement of the India League and the Congress in America, the shift in political climate 
since the signing of the Atlantic Charter and the criticism of the British in the devastating 
Bengal famine of 1943.30F31 To Auchinleck, they appeared to obstruct Mountbatten’s South 
East Asia Command by causing differences with the American forces under General Stilwell 
thus hurting inter-allied relations.31F 32  Mountbatten responded as only he could to this 
propaganda war. A ‘more than grateful’ Auchinleck profusely thanked him for he ‘could not 
have done more’. In words which would seem ironic three years hence, Auchinleck wrote:  
 
Personally, I do not mind what they say about me but these totally unfounded and unjustifiable 
accusations and innuendoes cannot fail to have a profoundly unsettling effect in India because the 
whole credit of the Army and myself must be lowered and their confidence reduced…You could 
not have been more generous or open and I appreciate very deeply.32F33  
 
Over the next couple of years, Auchinleck kept in touch with Mountbatten apprising him of 
the creeping politicisation, discontent, indiscipline and demoralisation in the Indian Army, 
reflecting the growing stronger political feeling in India.33F 34 When Mountbatten raised the 
question of employing the Indian troops to restore French and Dutch regimes in the face of 
nationalist opposition in South-East Asia, Auchinleck was wary ‘to disregard political feeling 
                                                          
31 On this, see Auriol Weigold, Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda during World War II (London, 
2008).  
32 HL. MB1/C136 (Folder 2). Mountbatten Papers. DO No. 80/S-1, Auchinleck to Lt General Henry Pownall, 7 
March 1944. 
33 HL. MB1/C138. Mountbatten Papers. DO No. 80/M-3/41, Auchinleck to Mountbatten, 29 April 1944. 
34 HL. MB1/C144. Mountbatten Papers. DO No. 80/M-3/II, Auchinleck to Mountbatten, 6 September 1945. 
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in India’ and of the risk of instability that it entailed.34F35 A soldier’s son, Auchinleck’s repeated 
‘intermission with politicians’ in both Britain and India, during war and in its absence, had 
been difficult.35F 36 Being the C-in-C at a time of post-WWII transition with ‘vast changes 
coming upon India’ during which ‘it was no longer possible for Indian Army to stand aloof 
from politics’, Auchinleck would find himself as ‘the pivot of a fierce political battle’, most 
dramatically manifested by ‘the INA Trials’.36F 37  Alongside it, the vexed question of the 
continued ‘use of Indian troops abroad’ and their consequent ‘withdrawal’ from overseas, 
evolved from September 1946, when the Interim Government under Jawaharlal Nehru came 
into office.37F 38  In a cabinet meeting of 18 September 1946, Nehru protested to the-then 
Viceroy Archibald Wavell against ‘the telegram from the Burma Command to Auchinleck 
suggesting that if the situation in Burma took a serious turn it might be necessary to use 
Indian troops for maintaining order and essential supplies’. Nehru urged Wavell to inform 
London ‘of our feeling that Indian troops should not be used against Burmans and, in any 
case, not for the suppression of industrial strikes or political movement’. Wavell tried to 
deflect this by bringing up the ‘considerable number of Indians in Burma [who] have to be 
given protection’. Nehru responded by broadening the question and asking for an 
examination of ‘the larger quantities of Indian troops being sent abroad for various 
                                                          
35 HL. MB1/C140 (Folder 2). Mountbatten Papers. DO No. 80/M-3/II, Auchinleck to Mountbatten, 14 October 
1945; Connell, Auchinleck, Auchinleck to Wavell, 13 November 1945, p. 824. 
36 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 3, 305, 593, 862.  
37 Ibid. p. 785; on the INA trials see pp. 794-819. Also, AG Noorani, Indian Political Trials, 1775-1947 (Delhi, 
2006). 
38 See Rakesh Ankit, Jawaharlal Nehru’s Interim Government, 1946-47: an Alternative Historical Assessment, 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, History and Society New Series No. 80, September 2015. 
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purposes’.38F39 At this time, the number of Indian troops serving outside India show the extent 
of concern for Wavell and Auchinleck: Japan (11400), Hong Kong (5800), Malaya (59000), 
Burma (78500), Siam (4000), Borneo (1000), Ceylon (1500), Iraq (16000), Middle-East 
(12500), Italy (400).39F40   
 
February-August 1947  
 
Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff Hastings Ismay called the communal breaking up of the Indian 
Army ‘the biggest crime…the biggest headache’ and ‘the problem which caused many of us 
the greatest grief’.40F 41  It emerged once the forthcoming transfer of power in India was 
announced by Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 20 February 1947 and Mountbatten was 
charged with the responsibility of overseeing it. Ismay, himself a ‘subaltern in India’ and an 
old friend, had served alongside Auchinleck in 1923 at Simla, where ‘a great future was 
prophesied’ for Auchinleck.41F42 He would have a ring-side view of the strained relations of a 
‘shy, sensitive and introvert’ Auchinleck with the ‘extrovert’ Winston Churchill over the 
Middle-East during the Second World War that ultimately led to his removal from there to 
India by August 1942.42F43 In March 1947, as Ismay arrived in India and met with Auchinleck, 
both agreed initially that for the future of British officers and other ranks in Indian Army, it 
was of paramount importance to retain its essential unity. Later, Mountbatten would accept 
                                                          
39 Nicholas Mansergh, EWR Lumby and Penderel Moon, ed., The Transfer of Power (TOP), 1942-47 (London, 
1970-83), Volume VIII, Nehru to Wavell, Item No. 331, pp. 538-39. 
40 The National Archives (TNA). PREM 8/541/6. Auchinleck’s note, 5 September 1946. 
41 The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 425. 
42 Ibid. p. 3, 40. 
43 Ibid. p. 269, 276. 
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the inevitable ‘sooner’ and easier than the Commander-in-Chief,43F 44  as he had not been 
associated with the Indian Army for over forty years.44F45 Still, Ismay would credit Auchinleck 
and his staff with ‘ingenious planning’ for the partition of the Army.45F46 Auchinleck’s own 
regiment from 1904, the 1st Punjab, was ‘half Muslim, a quarter Sikh and a quarter Rajput’ 
and its division meant for him a sad denouement of ‘all those links which he had spent a 
lifetime creating’. His last command as C-in-C was ‘markedly reticent’: ‘Discontinuance of 
Indian Army Orders. This is the last India Army Order’.46F47 
 
A key aspect of this discontinuance, as seen above, was the withdrawal of Indian troops from 
abroad. By February 1947, Nehru and his colleagues were insisting on the withdrawal of 
troops from Egypt and Palestine immediately, reduction from 14, 000 troops to 8, 000 in Iraq, 
withdrawal of 10, 440 Indian occupation force from Japan as soon as possible and withdrawal 
of troops from Burma and Malaya, ‘at their convenience’.47F 48  Their desire reflected the 
recommendations of Defence Secretary ADF Dundas’ summary note of 14 February 1947, 
conceding to ‘public opinion, good neighbourliness and friendly relationship’, and Defence 
Member Baldev Singh’s emphasis on ‘national interests’ as against ‘empire considerations’. 
These latter, the legacies of which could not be shedded immediately amounted to the 
presence of 27, 500 Indian troops in Burma, 26, 000 in Malaya, 3000 in Egypt and Palestine, 
14, 000 in Iraq, 10, 440 in Japan, with others being Borneo – 300, Hong Kong – 1000, and, 
Ceylon – 300. Except in Japan, the cost of Indian troops abroad was being borne by London 
                                                          
44 Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London, 1985), p. 389. 
45 See item nos. 108, 126, 159, 213, 239 in volume XI of (TOP), 1942-47. 
46 The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 428. 
47 Cornell, Auchinleck, p. 898. 
48 National Archives of India (NAI). File No. 114/CF/46. 26 February 1947.  
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and both Dundas and Singh reminded the cabinet that ‘when these troops are withdrawn, they 
will have to be demobilised and some 82, 540 men will be thrown out of employment’. 
Auchinleck hoped that the army would remain united and shared his fears otherwise with the 
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in London:  
 
I have no idea…whether India will stay in the Commonwealth…I and all my senior commanders 
and staff officers are most anxious at the way in which the politicians (and some of the senior 
Indian officers) are trying to force the pace of nationalisation [of the army].48F49   
 
At this time in March 1947, there were 13, 500 British officers in the Indian Army to 8, 500 
Indian officers. Mountbatten who had come to India with a political brief as opposed to a 
military one was quick to side-line the sentimental Auchinleck at the altar of his negotiations 
with the pragmatic Indian politicians. John Connell, Auchinleck’s pre-eminent biographer, 
has summed the turn-around in Auchinleck’s fortunes thus: 
 
There is no evidence to show that, after April 25, the C-in-C was consulted again as to policy... 
This is not to be construed as a deliberate affront…it was the expression of an extraordinary and 
unprecedented revolution in fundamental attitudes on the part of the Viceroy. 49F50  
 
In fact, it was not just Mountbatten in New Delhi but also the Chief of Imperial General Staff 
Viscount Montgomery in London who was keen to side-line Auchinleck. Twice in the first 
six months of 1947, Montgomery wanted to replace Auchinleck with General Slim but 
Mountbatten did not want to replace the Commander-in-Chief so close to the transfer of 
                                                          
49 John Rylands Library (JRL), University of Manchester. MUL 1215, Auchinleck Papers, d/o no. 80/S-3/47/6, 
Auchinleck to Scoones, 2 March 1947. 
50 Connell, Auchinleck, p. 885. 
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power.50F51 In mid-June, the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee was set-up alongside the 
Partition Council. Soon, Montgomery arrived in Delhi to try to make Auchinleck ‘more ready 
to accept the destruction of his beloved Army’.51F 52  Nevertheless, Auchinleck insisted on 
British officers to be retained during the process of ‘reconstitution’ so that the goodwill, trust 
and efficiency of the army would not be impaired by partition.52F53 In July 1947, Sir William 
Barton of the Political Department of Government of India wrote an article titled ‘The 
Defence of India’ in The Fortnightly, which set out ‘the danger of withdrawing all British 
military influence from India: laying the two relatively defenceless [and mutually hostile] 
dominions open to attack from Russia’.53F54 Yet another summary was prepared by the Defence 
Department on 1 August 1947 that recommended that all Indian forces abroad ‘should be 
withdrawn in a phased manner by January 1948’.54F55   
 
The Chiefs of Staff in London were alive to its implications and, in the Joint Defence Council 
meeting on 6 August 1947, Mountbatten informed Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Vallabhbhai Patel 
and others that London was anxious for long-term defence arrangements with and between 
India and Pakistan. The dominant geographical position of the Indian subcontinent had been 
prejudiced for the moment by partition and the announced withdrawal of the British forces 
and therefore mutual defence arrangements were imperative. A military delegation was 
expected later in the year to put a plan in place.55F56 By now, however, the British were finding 
                                                          
51 Ziegler, Mountbatten, p. 463. 
52 Ziegler, Mountbatten, p. 391. 
53 See item nos. 216 and 312 of volume XI of TOP.  
54 TNA. F 9522, FO 371/63565. 16 July 1947.  
55 NAI. File No. 114/CF/46. 1 August 1947.  
56 HL. MB1/D59/7-11 (Folder 2), Mountbatten Papers. JDC meeting, 6 August 1947.  
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themselves pitchforked by suspicion from both sides starting with the men on top – 
Mountbatten and Auchinleck. The Partition Council meetings on the division of armed forces 
were proving more difficult than thought. As Mountbatten shared with one of the provincial 
governors: 
 
So far we had been working on the basis of communal proportions in dividing the fighting 
services, the smaller partner by far being Pakistan. In the case of the Army, it worked out at a 
rough proportion of 70:30. In the case of the Navy, it worked at about 60:40 but as India has a far 
bigger coastline and more harbours and a far greater proportion of trade to guard, the ships were 
divided in the proportion 70:30. When it came to the air, the communal proportions worked out at 
80:20. As there are 10 squadrons (2 transport and 8 fighter), the Indian representatives claimed 8. 
However, the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee had recommended that on the analogy of 
the naval division, the proportions should be 70:30, since Pakistan had the North-west frontier to 
guard. The discussion became exceedingly acrimonious…There was an anti-British feeling 
against the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee for departing in favour of Pakistan.56F57  
 
The Congress had been complaining to Mountbatten about Auchinleck’s ‘pro-Pakistan 
attitude’ in the Joint Defence Council.57F 58  Mountbatten maintained that Auchinleck was 
‘merely trying to be fair’.58F 59 This was aan about-turn from only nine months ago, when 
Baldev Singh had written to Attlee that it was ‘imperative that Auchinleck remains for 2-3 
years given his good service, popularity with all ranks, invaluable experience, full faith in 
reorganisation from 2 ½ million men to 400, 000-500, 000’.59F60 On the other hand, Jinnah had 
                                                          
57 HL. MB1/D1, Mountbatten to Bourne, 5 August 1947. 
58 HL. MB1/D198. Mountbatten Papers. Patel to Mountbatten, 2 August 1947. 
59 HL. MB1/DB4 (Folder 2). Mountbatten Papers. Mountbatten’s personal report no. 15, 2 August 1947. 
60 TNA. PREM 8/583. Baldev Singh to Attlee, 12 December 1946.  
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told Mountbatten that the Muslim League no longer had faith in Auchinleck.60F61 On his part, 
Auchinleck thought that ‘there might be adverse Muslim comment to Mountbatten staying on 
as Governor-General of India only’.61F62 Nevertheless, he wanted Mountbatten to continue and 
offered to resign.62F63 Instead, from 15 August, he became the Supreme Commander of two 
armies: ‘a hope of continuity if no operational control’.63F64 The anomalies of being the ‘legally 
constituted embodiment of British authority after the transfer of power’, so as to reconstitute 
the successor states’ armies, were ‘many and obvious’.64F65 How much this continuity, let alone 
control, was going to be contested can be seen from an uncompromising letter Nehru wrote to 
Mountbatten about Auchinleck’s ‘approach relating to the partition of the Army’, almost 
three weeks before the partition of India: 
 
The mere fact that the Supreme Commander will be in administrative control for a limited period 
does not mean that he will be free to carry out his own ideas. What we have in mind is that he 
would endeavour…that the transition from the joint administration to our own administration 
would be smooth and as nearly in accord as possible with our own ideas regarding the future. If 
this is not clearly understood there is bound to be a conflict. In a way, the Supreme Commander 
will have the casting vote in the future Joint Defence Council, and if his general outlook is 
completely different from our own then clearly the Council will not function at all.65F66 
  
August-November 1947 
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The euphoria of independence came to India and Pakistan accompanied with the bitterness of 
large-scale population movements, refugee problems, massive communal riots and a threat of 
inter-dominion hostilities over the ‘unfinished business of partition’, first Junagadh, then 
Kashmir and possibly Hyderabad. Auchinleck met Mountbatten and pointed out that in case 
of hostilities breaking out between India and Pakistan, British officers should not be allowed 
to take an active part in such engagements.66F67 This was just as well for post-14/15 August 
1947, senior British officials/officers who continued in the subcontinent inevitably found 
themselves, what the CRO later termed as, ‘taking up cudgels’ on behalf of the two 
dominions.67F 68  This was most acutely reflected in the increasingly divergent positions of 
Mountbatten and Auchinleck, themselves. In this, Auchinleck had scant support from the 
Chiefs of Staff in London, from where Montgomery did not mince his views or words: 
  
Auchinleck’s usefulness in India has finished. He is 63; he has spent all his life in India under a 
previous regime; he is too old to readjust himself to new ideas, which he dislikes in his heart. He 
is viewed with suspicion by the senior officers of the Indian Army…I personally consider that if 
you want military matters to run smoothly and efficiently in India you will have to remove 
Auchinleck…if you do not do so you will have trouble…68F69  
 
Meanwhile, Nehru’s cabinet looked upon its army as ‘British-controlled machines’ and 
wished to nationalise it as soon as possible and certainly no later than 1 April 1948. 
Auchinleck was of the opinion that this would ‘ruin the Indian Army which will become an 
inefficient machine with political affiliations’. On the other hand, Pakistan was already 
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offering very good terms to those British officers, who were prepared to resign their British 
commissions and re-engage with the Pakistan Army. This scenario was complicated by, as 
Mountbatten reported to London, his personal impression that  
 
…the great majority of British officers have a bias towards the Muslims and although they behave 
in a perfectly impartial manner it is obvious that they get on better with the Muslims and I shall 
have to balance out the desirability of retaining British officers with the dominion of India against 
the ill effects of retaining officers who are neither trusted by the Indians nor trust them.69F70     
 
It was his long letter to Mountbatten on 13 September 1947, written against the backdrop of 
post-partition violence in the Indian capital that proved to be Auchinleck’s swan song. In it, 
he made his feelings plain that ‘not one single Muslim in Delhi today believes in the smallest 
degree in the good faith or intentions of this Government’, launched a broadside against the 
Sikhs and charged the Indian Government with attempts to establish a ‘Brahmin Raj’.70F71 Less 
than two weeks letter, on 26 September, Auchinleck read from Mountbatten a longer missive 
that confirmed the ‘volume of criticism in the Cabinet’ against him by Indian ministers 
resentful of his position and person as ‘a derogation of their sovereignty’, and, concluded thus: 
‘I can no longer prevent [the Indian leaders] from putting up an official proposal that the 
Supreme Headquarters should be abolished and replaced by an organisation with a less high-
sounding title and headed by less high-ranking officers’.71F 72 By now, Mountbatten wanted 
Auchinleck to go while his reputation held high, for as he informed the Supreme Commander 
that ‘one of the most balanced and level headed [Indian] Ministers complained recently that 
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you seemed to regard yourself as the champion of Pakistan’s interests’.72F73 Reacting resentfully, 
Auchinleck, who wanted to leave not before 31 December,73F74 complained to Attlee that he 
had  
 
…no hesitation whatsoever in affirming that the present Indian cabinet [whose head was 
Mountbatten] are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of 
the dominion of Pakistan on a firmer basis. In this, I am supported by the unanimous opinion of 
my senior officers, and indeed, by all responsible British officers cognisant of the situation.74F75   
 
At the tenth meeting of the Joint Defence Council in New Delhi on 23 September 1947, 
Mountbatten informed the Indians and the Pakistanis that reports reaching him indicated that 
British officers now serving in the two dominion armies were becoming less keen on 
continuing to serve in view of the recent large-scale disturbances and massacres in Punjab 
and Delhi as well as the worsening situation in Junagadh. Baldev Singh, India’s Defence 
Minister and ADF Dundas, Pakistan’s Defence Secretary, however, stated their opinion that 
services of British officers would be required during and after the period of reconstitution. 
Dundas also informed the Council that details as regards the number of British officers 
required by Pakistan were being worked out and would be available in early October. 
Mountbatten wanted the two dominions to make a public announcement of terms and 
conditions, which they were prepared to offer to British officers willing to serve and hoped 
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that these would be nearly as identical as possible to avoid competition.75F76 Meanwhile, in a 
sign of worsening relations between the dominions, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali 
Khan had complained to Attlee about India being unfair on post-partition riots, refugee 
movements and division of assets and requested him to inform other dominion governments 
about India’s behaviour, as well as call a Commonwealth meeting. Attlee refused the latter 
request but agreed to do the former. Laurence Grafftey-Smith, Britain’s High-Commissioner 
in Pakistan, who shared Liaquat’s feelings, warned the CRO that Pakistan would be 
  
…gravely disappointed by the Prime Minister’s decision to not meet the Pakistani request for 
mediatory action by other members of the Commonwealth between India and Pakistan…Pakistan 
Government feel entitled to invoke the sympathy and interest of other Dominions.76F77  
 
Grafftey-Smith considered it embarrassing that if Jinnah’s ‘moderate and reasonable enough’ 
appeal, of a team of Commonwealth representatives to visit India and Pakistan for joint 
discussions on present violence, was refused, then the alternative offered by Foreign Minister 
Zafrulla Khan and Liaquat was to take matters outside the ‘family footing’ and ‘call in 
outsiders [UNO] to mediate between two members of the Commonwealth’.77F 78  A defiant 
Nehru disagreed with Liaquat’s complaints and declined to have either a Commonwealth 
conference or UN observers. Instead, he wrote to Liaquat demanding ‘open and frank’ 
dealings.78F 79 On 27 September 1947, with hostilities in Junagadh seemingly imminent, the 
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Chiefs of Indian Army, Navy and Air Force Rear-Admiral JTS Hall, General RMM Lockhart 
and Air-Commander S Mukherjee submitted a reluctant paper to Baldev Singh for the 
attention of the cabinet about the projected operations there. It simply served to confirm 
Nehru cabinet’s frustrations about the continuing presence of British officers in the 
subcontinent:  
 
There is one other important factor – the position of British officers of all three services, including 
three armed forces commanders, serving with the Indian forces. These officers belong to the 
British fighting services and it would be impossible for any of them to take part in a war between 
the dominions or to be the instrument of planning or conveying orders to others should the 
operations now contemplated result in such a war or appear likely to do so.79F80  
 
The crux of this British military presence was ‘the continuation of the post of Supreme 
Commander [which] rankled with the politicians. [Moreover] many Indians considered 
Auchinleck to be biased towards Pakistanis’ – later vice-versa too when Auchinleck warned 
Jinnah in November 1947 that ‘if he tried to send Pakistani troops to Kashmir, Auchinleck 
would order all British officers to withdraw from Pakistan army’.80F81 It was for this reason that 
Mountbatten was not complaining. He pointed to Nehru that he ‘did not regret the present 
arrangement since it was the fact that the armed forces of both dominions were commanded 
and so largely officered by the British that was the final barrier against the two dominions 
being drawn into a war against each other’.81F 82  Having failed to keep a united India, 
Mountbatten’s next aim was to keep the divided subcontinent inside the Commonwealth, if 
possible with a united foreign and defence policy and the British military officers and civil 
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officials continuing there were the most vital factor for any success. Indeed, the 
Commonwealth was on everybody’s mind. Grafftey-Smith was exhorting the CRO that if 
Pakistan’s concerns about India were not addressed, ‘…serious thought may be given…to the 
one basic question mark in the present situation…If [Pakistan’s] association with the 
Commonwealth is of value, then the best possible way of winning their goodwill is by 
displaying a warmly sympathetic and practical interest in their troubles’.82F83       
 
In response, Archibald Carter, the permanent under-secretary at the CRO, visited Pakistan 
over 1-3 October 1947 and had a long talk with Jinnah about aid to Pakistan. Jinnah told 
Carter that his difficulties on the Punjab border and the north-west frontier, in essence not 
only his interest but the interest of India and of the Commonwealth as a whole, were 
increased by the fact that he would never get out of India his fair share of the existing military 
stores and equipment. He hoped to be able to get it from Britain (or the Commonwealth), but 
if that failed he would have to look elsewhere. Carter replied that while there was general 
sympathy in London for the initial financial difficulties of Pakistan, long-term defence 
requirements were a different matter given political difficulties. That is if Pakistan were 
asking for a form of assistance from Britain, which was not being accorded to India despite 
the fact that India might not have made any similar request. He did assure Jinnah that the 
question of frontier defence, as distinct from financial difficulties, raised issues in which the 
Chiefs of Staff in London would be interested.83F84 Liaquat did not disguise his disappointment 
at this cool reception given to Pakistan’s appeal. It was a cold douche to Pakistan’s hopes of 
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fraternal assistance and did little to dispel Pakistan’s suspicions of India’s intentions about 
their existence let along consolidation.84F85    
 
These were also illustrated in Pakistan’s ‘objections to the Supreme Headquarters being 
closed down by the 30th November’. Being the weaker party, it reasonably held that ‘the 
consequence of this abandonment would be that [it] could [not] be sure of obtaining [its] fair 
share of stores held in [India]’. In response, the ‘Indian Cabinet [felt] strongly’ about the 
closing down of Auchinleck’s Headquarters, ‘which [included] a Field Marshal as Supreme 
Commander, a Lieutenant General, an Air Marshal and a Vice-Admiral as Deputy Supreme 
Commanders…otherwise we should be faced with the anomalous position of having more 
senior officers to look after the interests of British officers than the armed forces of the two 
Dominions’.85F86 Consequently, Carter went back and prepared his paper on ‘Aid to Pakistan’ 
three weeks later. Ismay, who left India on 3 October 1947, made a statement on the defence 
situation in India to the Chief of Imperial General Staff five days later and, subsequently, to 
the Commonwealth Affairs Committee. Carter factored in Ismay’s appreciation in his report 
and later Ismay too commented upon it.86F 87 Archibald Carter’s note on ‘Aid to Pakistan’ 
concluded thus: 
 
It seems almost inevitable that, no doubt with great reluctance, without having any real data on 
which to calculate the risks involved and without any absolute certainty that even with such help 
as we can manage to give survival if possible if India become very actively hostile, we must adopt 
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the policy of assisting Pakistan so far as our own present difficulties admit and that we must do 
even at the risk of worsening our present entirely friendly relations with the Indian government.87F88 
 
Ismay’s comment was only slightly more ambiguous: 
 
Are we going to treat both dominions in precisely the same way or are we going to treat any 
request from either of them on their strict merits? It seems fantastic that Pakistan should be 
prevented from having any assistance merely because India does not require that particular form 
of assistance. Indeed, it would be only too easy for India to prevent Pakistan having anything at 
all by saying – “you must not favour them at our expense”.88F89 
 
While all this was going on in London, India and Pakistan were coming closer to hostilities in 
Kashmir with each passing day. Mountbatten, Auchinleck and the Chiefs of Staff had agreed 
to issue orders to British officers requiring them to ‘stand down’ in the event of a conflict 
between India and Pakistan.89F90 These orders were discussed by the Commonwealth Affairs 
Committee of the Attlee Cabinet on 13 October 1947. The committee, while in general 
agreement with Auchinleck and his powers to issue ‘stand down’ orders, felt it ‘most 
desirable that [HMG] should, if possible, be consulted before the decision was taken’ and 
asked Auchinleck to ‘make every effort to do so’. Further, the Supreme Commander was 
instructed to ‘consult with the United Kingdom High-Commissioners in India and Pakistan 
before taking any action himself or making a submission to [HMG]’.90F91 Thus began, in the 
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first fortnight of October 1947, a sequence, which eventually ended Auchinleck’s stay in 
India, with the closure of his office of the Supreme Headquarters of the Armed Forces of 
India and Pakistan. The clinching factor was Mountbatten’s progressive nod towards the 
Indians in the deepening distrust between Nehru’s government and Auchinleck. Mountbatten 
was helped in this by the senior-most British officers commanding the Indian Army, Rob 
Lockhart and Roy Bucher. When asked whether they would sooner face administrative chaos 
as a result of Auchinleck’s Supreme Headquarters closing down on 30 November 1947 or 
have a better shot at ‘reconstitution’ by having Auchinleck’s offices until the end-of-the-year, 
Bucher’s reply could not be clearer: 
 
I am certain that Rob and I would sooner face the administrative chaos than keep this appalling 
set-up one unnecessary day. We can always disentangle chaos but we cannot undo the mischief 
that they are doing every day to British-Indian relations, for every day that Claude stays here, he is 
undermining his own great reputation not only with all the Indians but, I am sorry to say with all 
the British who are not in his own HQ. I consider the 30 November the latest possible date for him 
to stay and would have thought he could have got out by 30 October.91F92 
 
Rob Lockhart too, concurred and, sharing their appreciation with the just-departed Ismay, 
Mountbatten also revealed that Roy Bucher had told him that Auchinleck and Frank 
Messervy, Pakistan’s Commander-in-Chief, had forced Lockhart to recommend to London 
the desirability of the continued presence of British officers in India and Pakistan as they 
would not fight among each other and would be able to arbitrate between the warring 
dominions. Auchinleck had apparently addressed the British commanders saying  
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…you are responsible to me and not to your governments. I am responsible to the British COS to 
see that there is no war between the two dominions and I intend taking every step to carry this out. 
At the slightest sign of war, I shall threaten to remove all the officers and if war breaks out, I shall 
actually do so. Your loyalty is to the HMG through me and not your dominions governments.92F93 
  
Mountbatten was informed of this by Bucher, who, having been informed thus by Lockhart, 
was worried at this example of Auchinleck taking a hand between India and Pakistan. 
Mountbatten knew very well that Pakistan would certainly object to the early closing down of 
the Supreme Headquarters since they, naturally, regarded Auchinleck’s office as the only 
means of getting their ‘pound of flesh’ out of India. But now, as the Governor-General of 
India, he was also beginning to argue that it would take up to two years to get Pakistan’s 
stores moved and a month more or less of Auchinleck in India could not make much 
difference. In any case, the Nehru government was formally pledged to transfer one-third of 
the stores to Pakistan given the necessary financial adjustments and Mountbatten was 
confident that Pakistan would get its share unless, of course, ‘the situation deteriorates even 
more’, which was an ever-present threat in the autumn and winter of 1947.  
 
By the end of the first week of October, the positions of each of the main protagonists were 
clear: to Auchinleck, 30 November was alright as the cut-off date for the division of Navy 
and Air Force but, for the ‘reconstitution’ of Army, with the British officer’s contract 
expiring only on 31 December that was the more suitable date. Moreover, he was convinced 
that he was the only officer in India that the British officers and the Pakistan government 
trusted, and nobody could take his place since ‘he would be pushed around’ by the Congress. 
For Arthur Smith, widely expected to be Auchinleck’s successor, it was impossible to close 
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down the Supreme Headquarters before the end of the year ‘as British interests would suffer’. 
On the other hand, Bucher, Lockhart, Elmhirst and Hall – British officers serving the Nehru 
government – were all ‘willing and anxious’ to take over not later than 30 November 1947.93F94 
Mountbatten called Auchinleck on 7 October and told him, in a difficult interview, that on 
account of ‘dignity, practicality, finance and Indian opposition’, he should leave by 30 
November 1947. Nor could he recommend Arthur Smith as his successor, given the cloud of 
suspicion above his head. Arthur Smith had been reported to proclaim at Auchinleck’s house, 
‘yes, ask any British officers of Lt Col [and above] rank in this room and they will tell you 
that they are pro-Pakistan’. Baldev Singh did not want him at the Supreme Headquarters. 
Auchinleck responded by making it clear that if he was pushed out then he would withdraw 
every British officer or other ranks with the two dominions in case of a conflict between them 
or between India and Hyderabad. He had already threatened Lockhart that he would transfer 
him to Pakistan or sack him given his involvement in Indian Army’s plans in Junagadh. 
Mountbatten’s sentiment was definitely not genuine, but his sense was correct when he wrote 
to Ismay: ‘My heart bled for “Auk”, he minds it all so much…’94F95 – his heart did not bleed for 
Auchinleck, but the latter definitely minded it all very much.   
 
Mountbatten had agreed with Auchinleck insofar as withdrawing British officers and other 
ranks employed in India and Pakistan in case of a conflict was concerned. But he felt that it 
should be done through the CRO in London and their High-Commissioners in New Delhi and 
Karachi, more tactfully rather than as a show of strength by Auchinleck’s Supreme 
Headquarters. He had provisionally prevailed upon Auchinleck ‘after most friendly 
discussion’ about the date of closure, 30 November, subject to the British Chiefs of Staff’s 
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decision.95F 96  It was a decision which did not take too long to come with Ismay and 
Montgomery supporting Mountbatten’s position in London.96F97 On 9 October 1947, Jinnah was 
presented with the fait accompli by Auchinleck and took it philosophically: ‘Kismet [fate]; I 
do not like it but we must bow to the inevitable’.97F98 Auchinleck now reluctantly prepared a 
note, which was discussed at the Joint Defence Council on 16 October 1947. Officially and 
publicly, Auchinleck gave four reasons for the closure: a) the progress made in the 
‘reconstitution’ of the armed forces, b) the ability of the armed forces of the two dominions to 
take over, c) the control and maintenance of the armed forces of the two dominions which are 
still overseas and d) the repatriation of the British units and their families. The real reasons, 
as he wrote to the Minister for Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel-Baker, were the 
‘absence of the necessary cooperation, harmony and goodwill between the parties concerned; 
obdurate attitude of the Government of India towards the Supreme Commander’s 
Headquarters and India’s refusal to cooperate [in the] impartial discharge of duties’.98F99 Rather 
obliquely, Auchinleck noted that ‘the situation existing today in the subcontinent differs 
radically from that which was confidently expected to result from partition’ and, therefore, he 
was finding it increasingly hard to carry out his task owing to the difference of opinion 
between the two governments and a lack of common ground for cooperation.99F100 Difference of 
opinion between the governments of India and Pakistan was one thing and was substantial 
enough but the bigger nail in the coffin of the Supreme Headquarters was the attitude evinced 
towards it by a ‘virulent’ Patel and a ‘hostile’ Nehru. To them, the Indian Army, as it existed 
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was nothing but a ‘British instrument designed to be commanded by British officers to 
implement British policy’. As Patel told Mountbatten: 
 
Supreme HQ [is] throttling the initiative of Indian Army and acting as the advanced outpost of 
Pakistan. They may think they are acting impartially but as they are all mentally completely pro-
Pakistan, they are in fact out to help Pakistan at every turn. The longer you leave Auchinleck and 
his HQ here, the more seriously will the friendship between the British and India be impaired.100F101  
 
Patel’s long-time secretary V. Shankar (ICS) would, later, confirm that the ‘Sardar felt that 
Auchinleck’s organisation was not as impartial as he should have been’ and claim that it was 
‘mainly through his [Patel’s] insistence, the post of Supreme Commander was abolished’.101F102 
Over September-October 1947, Patel especially minded Auchinleck’s alleged ‘subscription to 
the view that refugee traffic could be possibly resumed in both directions if the Sikhs could 
be effectively disarmed’ and enquired from both Mountbatten and Auchinleck.102F103 Thus, what 
Attlee would term ‘the latest of many services’ that Auchinleck did in India, the triple 
responsibility of division of the former army, welfare and withdrawal of remaining British 
soldiers and the maintenance of law and order especially in the Punjab,103F104 saw him clash 
squarely with the Indian leaders.    
 
Unlike Jinnah, Liaquat had objected to Auchinleck’s proposal of closing down his 
Headquarters by 30 November in the Joint Defence Committee meeting held at Lahore on 16 
October. To Mountbatten, Liaquat admitted that he did not believe that anyone, but a British 
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Supreme Commander could ensure his getting stores from India. He was not satisfied by 
Baldev Singh’s promises or even the entire Nehru cabinet’s orders as ‘lower-level Indians 
would sabotage the orders of their own government to defeat Pakistan’.104F105 Nevertheless, the 
juggernaut rolled on. On 19 October, Nehru formally informed Liaquat about the closing 
down of Auchinleck’s office by 30 November 1947.105F106 Liaquat replied indignantly accusing 
India of ‘lack of cooperation’ and giving an ‘incorrect and misleading impression’. He said 
that the Supreme Commander had been ‘carrying out his duties in an entirely impartial 
manner’, but that the Government of India did not ‘favour continuance of an impartial 
authority for carrying out fully the reconstitution of the armed forces’.106F107  
 
Writing to Ismay after the critical and cantankerous meeting of the Joint Defence Council on 
16 October, Mountbatten narrated the entire act. Baldev Singh had proved immovable on not 
just Auchinleck, but the existence of the office of Supreme Commander itself. He told 
Mountbatten that the Congress suspected that Auchinleck wanted to appoint Arthur Smith to 
succeed him and, if anything, the Congress mistrusted Arthur Smith even more than Claude. 
Calling Smith, the ‘pro-Pakistan evil genius’, Baldev went so far as to say that they would 
sooner keep Auchinleck than Smith.107F108 Given this insurmountable opposition from his own 
government, Mountbatten had ‘bullied’ Auchinleck and brought pressure to bear upon him to 
not just advance the date of his own departure from 31 December to 30 November but also 
for the closing down of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters. Liaquat’s vehement 
opposition was side-lined and Mountbatten sought to manage him by agreeing ‘to try and get 
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the whole of Indian cabinet to endorse the pledge that stores will be transferred’. Mountbatten 
also pointed it out to Liaquat that, in any case, if India did not intend then whoever was the 
Supreme Commander would be anyway powerless. As London and New Delhi had agreed, 
there was nothing more Pakistan could do about it. Moreover, as India owned the Supreme 
Headquarters’ buildings and were responsible for two-thirds of the staff pay, their insistence 
could not be resisted. Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh preferred the British Commander-in-
Chief of dominion forces to be responsible for their British officers to themselves or to 
London but not to any form of Supreme Headquarters.108F109  
 
Auchinleck, however, had not yet given up and Mountbatten braced himself for ‘another 
tussle with Claude’. In the event, he had ‘grossly underestimated the scene [he] was in for’. 
The bone of contention was that Mountbatten had hastened to send Auchinleck’s paper on the 
closure of his office discussed at the previous Joint Defence Council meeting to the Chiefs of 
Staff in London via Ismay. When Mountbatten revealed this to Auchinleck, the latter 
‘completely blew off’. When told that the Congress wanted their own Commander-in-Chiefs 
to look after British interests, in addition to India’s, he ‘blew up again’ and when finally 
informed that the Nehru government would not have Arthur Smith, ‘the lid blew completely 
off’. It proved hard for Mountbatten to convince Auchinleck that they were both on the same 
page and the Governor-General was trying to help.109F 110  Ismay lent a helping hand to 
Mountbatten in biding over the ‘troublesome time with Claude’ by asking him to assure 
Auchinleck that the Attlee Government was ‘looking into the question of Pakistan’s 
unofficial request for financial assistance and for help in obtaining military stores and 
equipment’. General Messervy had arrived in London on 20 October 1947 with proposals 
                                                          
109 HL. MB1/D196. Mountbatten Papers. Mountbatten to Ismay, 17 October 1947. 
110 HL. MB1/D303. Mountbatten Papers. Mountbatten to Ismay, 18 October 1947. 
32 
 
about British officers continuing in Pakistan in 1948. Of course, this raised political issues to 
be resolved keeping in mind India, from where their nominees were also arriving shortly in 
London with the Indian proposals.110F 111 When they did, they complained that many of the 
difficulties, which they had met in the course of the negotiations had been due to the fact that 
Messervy had already reached an agreement accepting provisions, which were unacceptable 
to New Delhi.111F112 
 
A bitter Auchinleck was not mollified. Sending his report to the CRO he did not mince his 
words and squarely held the Indian government as ‘the people who have made the present 
position impossible and they are the people who would like to get control over the British 
officers and other ranks who will still remain after I go’.112F113 In the ultimate analysis, above 
every other factor, was ‘the hostile atmosphere in Delhi’, which Auchinleck held to be the 
reason for his recommendation that his office may be closed down prematurely, thus bringing 
to a sad end his forty-four year association with the Indian Army.113F114 As he prepared to go, he 
also trained his guns at Mountbatten and told the Defence Minister AV Alexander that with 
respect to the situation in India, in his experience, ‘the most serious aspect [was] the way in 
which British – even Lord Mountbatten himself – are being forced to take sides…This 
gravely affects British ability to exercise a moderating influence’.114F115 Auchinleck, therefore, 
asked for a withdrawal of British officers from India and Pakistan especially as, by now, the 
crisis in Kashmir had begun and Indian troops had been air-lifted bringing uncomfortably 
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close the unprecedented reality of British generals, officers and soldiers on both sides 
planning and fighting battles with each other. Alexander refused the proposal because ‘it 
would be a confession of Britain giving up’.115F116  
 
Mountbatten had to agree with Auchinleck that preparation of plans for war with another 
dominion was not part of the contract of British officers in India and Pakistan and, in event of 
open hostilities between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, they would have to be relieved 
immediately. He asked Nehru to ensure that ‘plans and preparations for war against [Pakistan] 
should not be undertaken by anyone, either Indian or British’, for Mountbatten was also 
aware that such a move would have ‘wider implications’ that is, first and foremost, affecting 
feelings towards Britain in Pakistan, the weaker, more fragile and vulnerable state and second, 
for the defence of the Commonwealth vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.116F 117 British officials in 
Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Karachi had kept the CRO well-informed about the potential 
danger of any decision withdrawing British officers from Pakistan being regarded as ‘having 
let down Pakistan’ in a moment of crisis.117F118 By November 1947, there was a perceptible 
growth of anti-British feeling in many quarters in Pakistan for post-partition troubles.118F119 
During the infamous episode of Gracey refusing Jinnah’s orders to send Pakistan troops into 
Kashmir in late-October 1947, without a reference to Auchinleck and the latter flying up to 
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Lahore to prevail upon Jinnah in the first days of November,119F120 Robert Francis Mudie, who 
had stayed on as Governor in West Punjab, was supposed to have remarked: 
 
Why the hell Gracey was not carrying out Mr Jinnah’s orders? What had it got to do with the 
Supreme Command? What did it matter if the British officers were withdrawn? Could he not send 
the troops on without British officers?120F121 
 
It was all over on 8 November 1947 in the fourteenth meeting of the Joint Defence Council in 
New Delhi. The meeting considered a telegram from Noel-Baker which stated that, in view of 
the situation, which had arisen and of the representations of Auchinleck, His Majesty’s 
Government had reluctantly come to the conclusion that it had no option but to withdraw the 
British officers and other ranks, including the Supreme Commander himself, forming 
Supreme Commander’s Headquarters from India. The result of this would be that 
Auchinleck’s headquarters would cease to exist on 30 November 1947. Mountbatten 
remarked that he regretted that this subject had caused controversy. He personally believed 
that it was the right decision and, in view of the unanimous endorsement given by the Indian 
cabinet to the pledge that India would deliver to Pakistan the latter’s full share of stores, 
Pakistan’s principal objection had been met. Abdur Rab Nishtar, Pakistan’s representative 
and Communications Minister, made it clear that in his government’s opinion this decision 
was very unfair to Pakistan. Supreme Commander’s Headquarters had been set up to 
‘reconstitute’ the Armed Forces. This process had not been completed and the movement of 
stores had hardly finished. He wished to make it clear that Pakistan were not a party to the 
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decision. This had been forced upon Pakistan without their consent and in spite of the views 
they held and had declared.121F122 On his part, Auchinleck accepted a small farewell lunch on 25 
November, stayed a night with the Mountbattens and flew out of Delhi on 1 December at the 
age of 63. As he later put it in an interview, ‘one felt the whole time that one was killing an 
entity which had existed for a good many hundred years and with which you had spent the 
whole of your working life…It was the end of all things for an old Indian Army officer like 
myself’.122F123  
 
Conclusion 
 
Within a week of Auchinleck’s departure, Grafftey-Smith was reporting the ‘language of 
disillusion’ in Pakistan towards the ‘falsity of the allegedly “family” relationship existing 
within the Commonwealth’. He regretted London’s decision in view of the fact that there was 
‘no precedent for a situation fringing war between two members of the Commonwealth’ and 
concluded pessimistically:   
 
It would be unrealistic to pretend that Great Britain and the Commonwealth have not lost a great 
body of goodwill and friendship in this Dominion by allowing constitutional etiquette to outweigh 
the claims of family relationship…It would be certainly be unfortunate if any impression 
prevailed in London that their present silence means that the matter has been forgotten.123F124 
 
Mountbatten and his staff now turned their attention to the next-best scenario: to salvage the 
consolation of joint defence arrangements between India and Pakistan from the wreckage of 
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Auchinleck’s headquarters. Mountbatten hoped that the Joint Defence Council would 
eventually become a joint arrangement for defence, as his constitutional adviser Morris Jones 
had suggested, along the lines of Australia and New Zealand.124F125 Erskine Crum prepared a 
note and sent it to India’s Defence Secretary HM Patel. But there was no enthusiasm for it. 
This was going to be a difficult brief at the best of times but with daggers drawn in Kashmir, 
December 1947 was a singularly inopportune moment. VP Menon let Brockman know that 
Nehru’s ministers were unlikely to heed this.125F 126  Mountbatten nevertheless, rather 
characteristically, remained confident. He shared it with Auchinleck as he knew that the latter 
would be pleased to know if India and Pakistan were beginning to get together on the 
question of defence. Perhaps betraying a troubled conscience or maybe merely displaying 
minimum courtesy, Mountbatten wrote a detailed letter to Auchinleck assuring him that 
‘every outstanding point of difference between the two dominions in the Partition Council 
and the Joint Defence Committee has been taken out of the hands of the Arbitral Tribunal and 
a friendly compromise solution found’:  
 
For instance, although India had only given Pakistan 20 crores out of the cash balance, they have 
now given a further 55 crores and 9 crores on a debt repayment, making 84 crores cash out of 
their total holdings of 400. Similarly, Pakistan, who had only accepted 7% of uncovered debt to a 
unified India, have voluntary advanced this to 17.2% and India has given them 4 years 
moratorium and 50 years to pay it back. Hyderabad is now settled, a plebiscite has been agreed on 
for Junagadh and we are left with only one problem – Kashmir. Here again…I see some prospect 
of a solution, though unfortunately not in the immediate future.126F127  
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Auchinleck’s concern about British generals, officers and other ranks in India and Pakistan 
slowly getting ranged against each other was not unfounded. Lt General Russell, General-
officer-Commanding Delhi and East Punjab Command paid a four-day visit to Kashmir in 
December 1947 with the approval of Nehru and Lockhart but without the knowledge of 
Arthur Smith, who promptly reported this development to the British High-Commissioner. 
Smith pointed out that while there could be ‘no legal objection to such a visit and [in fact] it 
was desirable on military grounds’, there had to be a ‘political [objection] particularly in view 
of the Secretary of State’s assurance to the [leader of opposition] Mr. Churchill on 30 
October that “British officers would not be employed in combatant capacities on either side 
in this dispute”’.127F 128  However, as Russell’s visit had not received undue publicity and 
Lockhart assured that there was no intention to employ British officers as commanders in the 
field, the High-Commission recommended to the CRO that it seemed ‘best to take no notice 
of it’ as ‘presumably “combatant” in above assurance [was] to be regarded as referring only 
to actual fighting in the field and was not intended to cover visits of British Generals or Staff 
Officers or technical officers to Kashmir’. After all, on both sides they had responsibility for 
plans in connection with military operations in Kashmir as well as for the welfare of troops 
engaged and perhaps it was best to not raise any objections. In any case, from January 1, 
1948, service of British officers in Indian and Pakistani forces was to be governed by terms 
of new agreement with the dominions governments. Alexander replied to Mountbatten that it 
was okay as ‘Russell’s visit seems to have passed off quietly and without comment on either 
side but it would in my opinion be inadvisable to regard it as a precedent’.128F129 Mountbatten 
accordingly informed Lockhart and Elmhirst on 23 December and told the High-
Commissioner that he agreed with London’s suggestion. 
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Nevertheless, Mountbatten did raise the topic of India and Pakistan coming to a joint 
arrangement on defence ‘keeping in mind Russia’ in the seventeenth meeting of the Joint 
Defence Council in New Delhi in early 1948. Nehru responded to that by saying that defence 
was the outcome of external policy and could not be considered alone and divorced from that. 
Until the external policies of India and Pakistan fitted in together, joint defence was difficult 
to determine. Liaquat agreed with Nehru that India and Pakistan first needed to coordinate 
their foreign policy. Mountbatten mentioned the possibility of a British Military Delegation, 
which intended to come to India and Pakistan to discuss Commonwealth defence. This had 
been pending for long as Attlee had wanted this to happen even before the transfer of power. 
On this, both Prime Ministers continued to stall.129F130 The Joint Defence Council itself was 
coming to an end. The nineteenth and last meeting was held on 19 March 1948 at New Delhi 
and it ceased to exist from 1 April 1948.130F131 Mountbatten himself was initially supposed to 
leave on this date but, as Auchinleck sardonically put it to Ismay, he ‘“allowed” himself to be 
“persuaded” to stay on till June’. Auchinleck was not alone in wondering as to what was 
‘really on his mind?’131F 132  As Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten’s official biographer, puts it, 
Auchinleck like most British officers may have preferred Muslims to Hindus but as an 
honourable man, he struggled nobly to be impartial – not an easy task in 1947. Perhaps, as 
suggested, he was ‘less agile in mind and tractable in manner’ and thus less able to 
circumvent his prejudices.132F133 To his own biographers, Auchinleck, ‘victor at Alamein’,133F134 
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‘the least political of all soldiers’, was ‘the lonely soldier…tragically solitary’ through the 
ordeal(s) of transfer of power and transition of army.134F 135 To Pakistanis, his hastened and 
enforced departure was one more illustration of Mountbatten’s partiality towards the Indians. 
To Indians, Auchinleck’s views proclaimed after 1947 simply confirmed their earlier mistrust 
of him. In 1948, Auchinleck prophesised ‘a general decentralisation and break-up of the idea 
that India is a country…The British tried to consolidate it but achieved nothing permanent. 
No one can make a nation out of a continent of many nations’.135F136 It was precisely the task 
that Nehru and Patel were engaged in and they were not sorry to see him go.  
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